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PRELIMINARY AND INCOMPLETE. 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we extend Tobin’s Q model under financial frictions (Hennesy, Levy, and 
Whited, Journal of Financial Economics (2007)), using a discrete-time version of their model, 
to include private benefits of control of managers and other stakeholders and soft budget 
constraints in the form of money injections into the firm. Managers are not viewed to 
maximise shareholder value, but to maximise the value of their shareholding plus their 
private benefits of control. Private benefits of control introduce elements of asset stripping 
into the model. We characterize the optimal investment policy, analyse comparative statics 
and discuss applications to firms in transitional economies. 
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1. Private Benefits of Control and Optimal Investment 
 
In this paper, an investment model that allows for agency and control problems is presented. 
Mykhayliv and Zauner (2013) present a special case of this model and an empirical 
specification motivated by this model to study corporate investment in Ukraine. 
 The financial constraints include convex cost of external equity, debt overhang and 
collateral constraints on new borrowing as in Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2007). However, 
the managers of the firm do not maximize shareholders’ wealth as in Hennessy, Levy and 
Whited (2007), but  the wealth of managers which consists of the value of management 
shareholdings plus management’s private benefits or a linear combination of the firm’s value 
and the private benefits of managers in form of a fraction on the operating profits. This 
extension is motivated by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Wu and Wang (2005). In line with 
Wu and Wang (2005), the private benefits of managers have to be financed out of profits of 
the firm and exert a negative externality on outside shareholders. 
The financial constraints are modelled as in  Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2007). 
Investors are risk-neutral. The (risk-free) discount rate is  . The exogenous state variable t  
models innovations in output prices, variable factor prices and productivity. The capital stock 
changes according to ttt IKK  1)1(  , where tK  is the capital stock at the beginning of 
period t, tI  is investment in period t and is depreciation. Gross profits are given by  
),( ttKF   and capital adjustment costs by ),( tt KIG . Net profits are therefore
),(),( tttt KIGKF  . We make the standard assumption that F and G are twice continuously 
differentiable, F is strictly increasing and homogeneous of degree one in capital and G is 
strictly convex and homogeneous of degree one in (I,K). 
The monetary value of external equity financing is tX , with 0tX  if the firm pays a 
dividend and shareholders receive tX ; and 0tX  if the firm raises external equity. There is 
a convex cost of external equity, 0tX , to model the impact of informational asymmetries 
(Myers and Majluf (1984)). The cost of equity function  ),( tt KXH  satisfies 
ttt XKXH ),(  for all 0tX , that is, negative values of tX  or dividend payments, are 
equivalent to shareholders facing a negative cost. To guarantee existence of an optimal 
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solution the function H is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and weakly 
convex in tX ; it is decreasing and convex in tK , and homogeneous in ),( tt KX . 
The firm has access to a bank credit line modelled by the endogenous state variable tB , 
the credit line balance. The bank demands collateral ttt KLB )( , where )( tL  is the 
liquidation value of a unit of capital tK  and the bank has absolute priority in case of default. 
The interest on the bank credit line is r, and because of the collateral it is risk free. If the firm 
saves it earns an interest rate of rrs  . Denote the effective interest rate  . The changes of 
the bank credit line are governed by the financial policy tg , that is, 1 ttt BBg . The bank 
enforces the collateral constraint by imposing ])([ tttt BKLg   , that is, the bank allows 
the firm to close the gap between the bank credit line balance and the upper bound LK at the 
rate . Intuitively,  tg > 0 and  0tB  means that the firm is drawing on the credit line,  tg > 
0 and  0tB  means that the firm is reducing its stock of cash; tg < 0 and  0tB  means that 
the firm pays bank debt; tg < 0 and  0tB  means that the firm increases its cash stock. 
Another financial constraint incorporated in the model is debt-overhang (Myers (1977)). The 
firm has pre-existing, non-negotiable public debt, denoted D, with a perpetual coupon 
payment of b>0. 
The manager maximizes his wealth and does not maximise shareholder value. This 
wealth consists of the market value of the shareholdings of the managers, that is, the 
percentage of manager’s shareholding of all outstanding shares times the present discounted 
value of the firm plus private benefits that are a fraction c  of the present discounted value of 
operating profits or cash flow. More precisely, the objective function of the manager is 
 
},)],(),([),({0  
t
tttt
t
t
tt
t KIGKFcKXHE   
where ]1,0[  is the percentage of managers’ shareholding and ]1,0[c  is the percentage of 
the operating profits that the managers obtain. For simplicity it is assumed that the private 
benefit parameter c does not vary over time and is exogenously given. 
The following budget constraint has to be satisfied for each t, 
)],(),([),(),( tttttttttttt KIGKFcBbKIGIKFgX  
The left hand side displays the sources of funds, that is, external equity, new bank borrowing 
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or reduction in the cash buffer stock and cash inflow from current operations. The right hand 
side displays the uses of funds, that is, investment cost, (indirect) capital adjustment cost, 
payments on public debt, interest on the bank credit line, and the costs of the private benefits. 
The budget constraint can be rewritten as 
),()1(),()1( tttttttt KFcgBbKIGcIX    
The outside shareholders play a passive role. However, being shareholders, the outside 
shareholders also bear the costs of the private benefits of managers because the budget 
constraint above contains the private benefits of managers as a cost, )],(),([ tttt KIGKFc  .  
The state of the system at each point in time t is described by ),,( ttt BK  . At each t, the 
manager selects a financial policy tg  and an investment policy tI  and an optimal time to 
default T to maximise the objective function of managers given above. The maximisation 
problem of the managers is as follows  
 
},)],(),([),({max 0},{ 0,  
t
tttt
t
t
tt
t
TIg
KIGKFcKXHET
ttt

 
subject to ttt IKK  1)1(  , 
1 ttt BBg , 
])([ tttt BKLg   , and 
),()1(),()1( tttttttt KFcgBbKIGcIX   . 
Let tBtKt  ,, ,,  be the Lagrange multiplier of the first, second and third constraint, 
respectively. The Lagrange expression is given by  
)]},])([(
)())1((
)],(),([),()1[({
1,1,
0
ttttt
tttBttttKt
tttt
t
tt
t
gBKL
BBgKKI
KIGKFcKXHEL








 
where it is implicitly assumed that the budget constraint has been substituted in place of tX , 
that is, ),()1(),()1( ttttttt KFcgBbKIGcI      and that 01 B  and 01 K .  
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The first order condition of the Lagrange expression with respect to tg , the financing 
policy, gives tXBt tH   )(, . The complementary slackness condition yields the 
following optimal financing rule. If 0t , we have )(,  tXBt H . If 0t , then we have 
)(,  tXBt H  and ])([ tttt BKLg   .  
The shadow cost of bank debt is given by tB  and tXH represents the marginal cost of 
equity finance and, therefore, 
tX
H  represents the marginal cost of equity finance managers 
are facing. When the collateral constraint is not binding, then the optimal finance policy set 
the marginal cost equal to the shadow cost of bank debt. When the collateral constraint is 
binding, the marginal cost of equity is larger than the marginal cost of bank debt because of 
credit rationing. 
The first order condition with respect to investment tI  is  
tIttItt
cGGccGGcHq ItBtIXtK  ))1(1)(())1(1)((   
where q is defined as the shadow value of a unit of (installed) capital. This optimality 
condition states that the shadow value of a unit of capital is equal to the marginal cost of 
investment taking into account the cost of the funds and the private benefits of the managers.  
Optimal investment under financial constraints and firm value maximisation (Hennessy, 
Levy and Whited (2007)) is a special case of this model when there are no private benefits of 
managers and managers maximize the market value of the firm. In this case 1  and 0c . 
The optimality condition, )1)(()1(
ttt ItBtIXtK
GGHq   , or,
1),( 
t
t
X
ttI
H
q
KIG  coincides with the one in Hennessy, Levy and Whited (2007). The 
optimality condition shows that the standard implication that the rate of investment is higher 
for firms with high marginal q. However, in contrast to neoclassical models of investment, 
conditional on marginal q,  firms that issue equity invest less (Hennessy, Levy and Whited 
(2007), p. 699). Under perfect capital markets, the model further specializes. In this case, 
firms do not default, that is, T , there are no collateral constraints that are binding and the 
cost of external equity is one. This implies that 0t  and 1tXH . It follows that marginal q 
is equal to average q (Hayashi (1982)). 
 
 
 
6 
The model can be adapted to also include a soft budget constraint and private benefits 
of other controllers or stakeholders. To model soft budget constraints, assume that the 
government or governmental organization injects a sum of money into the firm in each 
period, denoted tS . Each controller or ownership category i,  enjoying private benefits, has a 
share ic , 10  ic , ,...2,1i , of operating profits of the firm. Let 1c  denote the private 
benefits of the management, that is, the share of the managers on the operating profit.  The 
budget constraint of the firm is now given by 
 
i
ttttittttttttt KIGKFcBbKIGISKFgX )],(),([),(),( 
,where the left hand side displays the sources of funds and the right hand side displays the 
uses of the funds. The left hand side now includes the money injections of the government or 
other organizations and the right hand side the costs of the private benefits of stakeholders 
and the managers. Note that the private benefits of controllers other than the managers acts 
like a cost to the firms, but does not influence the objective function. This is consistent with 
the view that these controllers do not interfere with running the firm. If this is the case, the 
model can be suitably amended. 
The first order condition with respect to investment tI  is  
tIttItt
GcGcGcGcHq I
i
itBtI
i
iXtK 11 ))1(1)(())1(1)((   
 
where )(
tX
H is evaluated at ttt
i
itttt
i
it SKFcgBbKIGcI   ),()1(),()1(   
and q is defined as the shadow value of a unit of (installed) capital.  
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